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CHOICE OF FORM AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides the first detailed empirical analysis of firms'
choice of organizational form. It provides important evidence on
whether there is an efficient market in organizational forms or
firms' choice of form is impeded by network externalities. We focus
on formations of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited
liability companies (LLCs) in examiningthe effect of various factors
on firms' choice of business form. Our data provides important
evidence against the network externalities hypothesis. Because the
LLP and LLC forms are similar except for the LLPs link to the
existing "network" of partnership law, firms would prefer the LLP
to the LLC form if network externalities mattered. In fact, we find
that firms prefer the LLC form. Moreover, the reduced relative
popularity of LLCs in states that impose entity taxes on LLCs but
not LLPs, and the increased relative popularity of LLCs in states
and years in which LLCs have particular inherent advantages,
provide further evidence that the inherent characteristics of the two
business forms, rather than network externalities, are driving
choice of form.

* Foundation Professor and Professor of Law, respectively, George Mason University
School ofLaw. Funding was provided by the George Mason University Law and Economics
Center. Valuable comments were provided byD. Bruce Johnsen, Michael Kiausner, Leandra
Lederman, Stan Liebowitz, Todd Zywicki, and participants at a session of the Canadian Law
and Economics 1999 Annual Meeting, at a workshop at the Center for Public Choice at
George Mason University, and at the Law & Entrepreneurship Research Conference at
Lewis and Clark Law School.
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There have been significant changes over the last decade in
organizational forms for closely held business associations. Prior to
1988, closely held firms had two major organizational forms from
which to choose. The general partnership form was designed for
very closely held or professional firms, and featured unlimited
liability for owners combined with no entity-level tax. The corporate
form combined limited liability with taxation at both the owner and
entity levels unless the firm complied with the organizational and
other requirements imposed by Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 There were many other organizational forms, most
notably including the limited partnership, which combines limited
liability for passive owners with flow-through taxation for closely
held firms. In general, however, tax rules prevented firms from
obtaining full-fledged limited liability without entity-level taxation.
The landscape changed in 1988 when the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for the first time de-emphasized the link between
limited liability and entity-level tax. This led to the rapid spread of
two new organizational forms, the limited liability company (LLC)
and limited liability partnership (LLP). These business entity forms
allowed firms to combine corporate and partnership characteristics.
The development of state business forms led to increased tax
flexibility, culminatingin the eliminationin 1996 of anyrestrictions
on the organizational rules firms had to adopt in order to avoid
federal entity-level tax.
The recent proliferation of organizational forms raises important
questions about why and how firms choose particular forms. On the
one hand, firms may select business forms based on their business
needs and the forms' inherent attributes. Under this theory, there
is an efficient market for business forms, and the most successful
forms are those that minimize firms' operating costs.2 On the other
hand, some kind of "lock-in" phenomenon may bind firms to business forms that are not best suited to their needs. Under this
theory, removing or minimizing the impediment, for example by not
1. Generally, S Corporations are certain small businesses that are tax exempt at the
entity level. I.R.C. §§ 1361.1363 (West 2000).
2. "Efficient" in this context means that firms make optimal choices in light of the tax
and regulatory background, and not that the tax laws and regulations that drive choice of
form are themselves optimal-
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enforcing or narrowly interpreting some default terms of business
associations or limiting firms' choices through uniform or federal
laws, would increase social welfare. One particular type of lock-in
phenomenon that the literature has emphasized is attributable to
"network externalities." According to this theory, firms may stick
with organizational forms that provide networks of case law, forms,
and other materials even if a move to a new organizational form
would otherwise better suit their needs.
The literature on choice of form so far has presented little if any
evidence for or against any particular theory. A laboratory for
testing theories of choice of form, specifically whether firms are
impeded in moving to optimal forms, now exists, however, thanks
to the relatively recent development of alternative organizational
forms for closely held firms, changes in firms' choice of organizational form over a relatively short time period, and tax and other
legal developments affecting choice of form. The quick spread of
LLC statutes since the initial change in tax rules and rapidly
increasing numbers of LLCs indicate that restrictive tax rules were
the main impediment to efficient choice of form and that in a no-tax
world firms will select the business form best suiting their needs.
On the other hand, LLCs seem mainly to be replacing partnerships
and there seemingly is no widespread migration from the corporate
form despite the change in tax rules. This is despite the fact that
corporate-type default rules apparently are inappropriate for closely
held firms because they provide for centralized management and
unrestricted exit. Thus, the persistence of incorporation may be
because of network externalities.
We address these issues by presenting data on the choice
between LLCs and LLPs. Our approach provides a more precise
analysis of firms' reasons for choice of organizational form than has
been presented so far. LLCs and LLPs are closely similar from the
standpoint of tax and organizational rules except that the LLP is
linked to the existing partnership law "network." Thus, our data
enables a focus on the role of network externalities in the choice of
form. The data indicate that the inherent characteristics of the
business forms, such as their state tax implications, are much more
significant factors in choice of organizational form than network
externalities.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
recent history of choice of organizational form by closely held firms.
In general, this history indicates that tax considerations play a
major role in choice of form but that other factors may impede
closely held firms from choosing the organizational form that is
optimal in the sense of minimizing firms' operating costs. Part H
discusses some possible impediments to choice of optimal form. Part
II discusses data on the choice between the LLP and LLC forms
that illuminate the role of tax and non-tax factors, particularly
including network externalities, in the choice of organizational
form. Part IV presents implications and conclusions.
I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF CLOSELY HELD FIRMS
The business association landscape for closely held firms once
featured only corporations and partnerships. In general, this choice
forced firms to make tradeoffs concerning three elements: asset
partitioning, governance, and taxation.
The owners of most firms can be expected to prefer to separate
their personal assets from their business assets. This involves
restricting business creditors' recovery to business assets and not
the owners' personal, non-business assets, a rule that is commonly
referred to as limited liability,' as well as permitting personal
creditors to recover only out of personal assets." Although owners
of many closely held firms offer personal guarantees to particular
business creditors, they may still prefer default rules providing
for both types of asset partitioning because of the costs of
contracting for partitioning when the default rules are otherwise.'

3. Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership,70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 427-38 (1992) (discussing need for limited liability in
closely held firms).
4. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The EssentialRole of OrganizationalLaw,
110 YALEL.J. 387,393-96 (2000) (distinguishing between "aT ative" and"defensive" asset
partitioning).
5. Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Formsfor Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence
from LLCs, 73 WAH. U. L.Q. 369,407-10 (1995). For a contrary views of the importance of
limited liability in closely held firms, see generally Richard A. Booth, Profit-seeking,
Individual Liability, and the Idea of the Firm, 73 WAH. U. L.Q. 539 (1995).
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The corporate form provides for both types of asset partitioning,
while state partnership law provides for neither.'
With respect to taxation, an incorporated firm is subject under
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to "double"
taxation on profits at the corporate level and on distributions to
the owners 7 unless it elects to be covered by, and complies with,
Subchapter S of the IRC.8 A partnership is generally subject only to
an owner-level tax under Subchapter K of the IRC.
With respect to governance, partnership statutes are designed for
closely held firms with only a few owners and illiquid ownership
interests, while corporate statutes are designed for firms with many
owners and liquid interests and are relatively unsuited for closely
held firms. Default rules in the two types of firms reflect the basic
tradeoff between exit and voice. Corporate shareholders can exit
freely by s elling their shares but have no direct say in management.
Partners cannot transfer management rights without co-owner
consent,9 but participate directly in management of the firm and
approve important matters by unanimous vote.1" Reflecting the
illiquidity of partnership interests and partners' personal liability
for partnership debts, partnership statutes give each partner the
power to dissolve at will." Corporations can be dissolved only by
majority shareholder and director vote.1
Thus, the traditional choice between corporation and partnership
offered firms two extremes of organizational form. Choosing the
corporate form involved a tradeoff of limited liability for entity-level
taxation and default rules that were basically unsuited for closely
held firms. Choosing the partnership form involved a tradeoff of
default rules designed mainly for closely held firms and no entity6. The Unif P'ship Act § 40 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 901 (1995), provides for priority of personal
creditors in personal assets and business creditors in partnership assets. However, this rule
was disregarded in bankruptcy and is not included in the Revised Unif. P'ship Act (1994), 6
U.L.A. (1995). Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic and Limits ofPartners'Liabilityin Bankruptcy,
32 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 31, 66-68 (1997).
7. I.R.C. § 11 (West 2000) (corporations subjectto taxontheirtaxable income); § 61(aX7)
(requiring shareholders to include distributions in their income).
8. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
9. Revised Unif P'ship Act § 27; Unif P'ship Act § 503.
10. Revised Unif. P'ship Act § 401; Unif. P'ship Act § 18.
11. Revised Unif. P'ship Act § 801; Unif. P'sip Act § 31.
12. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1991).
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level tax for features that many closely held firms would not want,
including personal liability 3 and dissolution-at-will. This basic
relationship is depicted in Table ."
The organizational form landscape first began to change with the
development of corporate law provisions designed for closely held
firms. This involved developments at both state and federal levels.
State legislatures passed special close corporation provisions, which
applied default rules appropriate for close corporations, including
share transfer and dissolution provisions, as well as clarifying close
corporations' ability to opt out of standard corporate terms such as
requirements for management by a board of directors and annual
shareholders' meeting. 5 These provisions applied to firms that both
elected coverage in their certificates and met certain qualifications
intended to bar access by publicly held firms. 1
At the federal level, beginning in 1958, corporations were
permitted to elect taxation under Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code. This section generally provides for partnership-type
tax for relatively small firms (restricted to 75 owners) 7 meeting
requirements for simple capital structure (i.e., one class of stock) s
and type of shareholders. By restricting partnership-type taxation
to the smallest and simplest firms, Subchapter S minimizes
revenue loss and offers relatively little opportunity for manipulation. Meanwhile, the largest firms-those that have liquid
markets for their shares-are subject to the corporate tax regardless of organizational form. 9 One important difference between
13. As to the unsuitability of personal liability for many closely held firms, see Ribstein,
supranote 3.
14. Tables 1 through 5 may be found infra pages 129-40.
15. For general discussions ofclose corporation statutes, see F. HODGE O'NEAL&ROBERT
B. THOiMPSoN, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1986); Dennis S. Kaijala, A Second
Look at Special Close CorporationLegislation, 58 TM L. REv. 1207 (1980); Dennis S.
Kaijala, An Analysis of Close CorporationLegislationin the United States, 21 ARiz. ST. L.J.
663 (1989); Tara J. Wortman, Note, UnlockingLock-In.Limited LiabilityCompaniesandthe
Key to Underutilizationof Close CorporationStatutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362 (1995).
16. For a summary of types of provisions, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSou,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 189-90 (3d ed. 1996).
17. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1XA) (West 2000). The original limit of 35 was raised to 75 by the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1301,110 Stat. 1755,1777
(1996).
18. I.R.C. § 1361(bXl)(D).
19. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (providing that a "publicly traded partnership" is taxed as a
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partnership-type taxation under Subchapter K and taxation under
Subchapter S is the relative difficulty in the latter case of stepping
up the basis of firm property and thereby avoiding tax on the
20
appreciation.
A big part of the business form story is the rapid rise of the
limited liability company (LLC). The LLC began in Wyoming in
1977.21 In 1988 the IRS approved partnership tax treatment of
LLCs organized under the Wyoming statute.2 2 Thus, for the first
time firms could have full-fledged limited liability without a
separate entity-level tax.2 This triggered the rapid spread of LLC
statutes' and increases in new formations of LLCs beginningin the
early 1990s.' Within eight years of the 1988 tax ruling, all states
had adopted LLC statutes providing for recognition of foreign
LLCs.2 6 Unlike the special close corporation statutes, the LLC was
a new form, and was not linked to an existing form.2
LLPs were developed shortly after LLCs started to become
popular. The LLP was first invented in Texas in 1991, primarily to
help lawyers to escape sudden tort and regulatory liability arising
out of savings and loan cases.' It was adopted in Louisiana in 1992,
in three more jurisdictions in 1993 and in thirteen additional
corporation).
20. John W. Lee, A PopulistPoliticalPerspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe:
"Heythe Stars MightLieBut the NumbersNeverDo, 78 TEX. L.REV. 885,928 (2000) (stating
that"[tihe most significant distinction between Subchapters K and S entities is the inability
to step up the basis of inside S Corporation assets upon the death of a shareholder or
redemption of her stock interest, as ... under a Section 754 election").
21. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U.
COLO. L. RaV. 855, 855-59 (1995).
22. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361.
23. The IRS reacted to the Wyoming development by first proposing to amend the
classification rules to classify it as a corporation, Classification of Limited Liability
Companies, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709-10 (proposed Nov. 17, 1980), and then withdrawing the
proposal and announcing it was studying the issue, Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.
24. Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence ofthe Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAw. 1,
4(1995).
25. See Table 2 infra p. 130 (listing formations by state).
26. Statutes are analyzed and tabulated in LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIAIITYCOMPANIES app. 13-1, (1992 & Supp. 2000). For

a history of the LLC, see Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability
Company, 59 OH1O ST. L.J. 1459 (1998).
27. See Table 1 infra p. 129.
28. Robert W. Hamilton, RegisteredLimited Liability Partnerships:Presentat the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1068-74 (1995).
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jurisdictions in 1994. Virtually all states had adopted LLP statutes
by early 1998.29 LLPs closely resemble LLCs except that LLPs are
explicitly linked to the existing body of partnership law and
practice."0 LLP statutory provisions are part of the states'
partnership laws, and these laws explicitly define an LLP as a
partnership.3 1 A general partnership therefore does not lose the
advantages of its existing set of contracts by becoming an LLP as it
might if it became an LLC. Moreover, the LLP is closely equivalent
to the LLC in the critical respect of tax treatment. Particularly in
the wake of the elimination of the tax classification rules there is no
significant difference between LLCs and LLPs with regard to
federal income taxation. 2
The above history provides the backdrop for several phenomena
that must be explained by theory and data:
(1) Fewer than half the states adopted special close corporation
provisions,s and only a small fraction of firms have incorporated
under those provisions that have been adopted.' It is not clear why
that should have been the case, since the combination of these
statutes with Subchapter S seems to provide a way that firms could
advantageously combine the characteristics of the corporate and
partnership forms.
(2) The history of the LLC form is ambiguous. On the one hand, the
rapid acceptance of the LLC soon after clearing the tax classification hurdle indicates that this form more successfully addressed
29. The spread of the LLP form is discussed in ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRYE. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIPACT § 1.01 (2000).

30. See Table 1 infra p. 129.
31. BROMBERG& RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, § 1.02(a).
32. Id. § 7.05. There are, however, a few differenceswithrespect to theirtreatment under

other federal and state tax laws. See infranotes 66-136 and accompanying text.
33. Wortman, supra note 15, at 1364 n.11. It has been theorized that there was little
demand for such provisions, Roberta Romano, State Competition for Close Corporation
Charters:A Commentary, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 412-14 (1992), and that state legislatures
had little incentive to fill any demand that existed in the absence of a market for foreign
incorporation business, Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporationsin the Age of Statutes, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 372-76 (1992). This Article focuses on the demand side of the story
inherent in firms' reasons for choosing a particular form. The political story is outside this
focus, but itis worth noting that it appears to be directly refuted by the widespread adoption
of LLC and LLP statutes. Ribstein, supranote 5, at 372.
34. Wortman, supranote 15, at 1362-63.
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the needs of closely held firms than had the close corporation form
and was being held back by tax impediments. On the other hand,
data indicate that most LLCs are firms that had been partnerships,
or would have been partnerships if the LLC form were unavailable. 5 In other words, the LLC evidently is not replacing the
close corporation form. Why should this be the case if the LLC
offers not only limited liability and partnership-type taxation but
also greater organizational flexibility than corporations?
(3) As shown by Table 2, the LLP form has been much less
successful than the LLC, despite the fact that LLPs offer LLC-type
features plus the seemingly advantageous linkage with the substantial existing body of partnership law. Does this indicate that
linkage is a cost rather than a benefit?
These questions are addressed by the theories discussed below in
Part II, and then by the data discussed below in Part III.

II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHOICE OF BUSINESS FORM
This Part presents possible reasons why firms might choose
particular business forms, and some potential explanations for the
phenomena noted at the end of Part I. Subpart A compares the
internal organizational rules of the various business entity statutes.
Subpart B examines the different ways tax and regulatory rules
apply to these entities. Both subparts discuss the choices facing
newly forming firms. Subpart C discusses the costs that confront
existing firms that are changing from one type of business entity to
another. Finally, Subpart D focuses on the main issue addressed in
this paper-the extent to which "network externalities" might
impede starting up a new type of business entity.
A. Optimal Default Rules
Firms' choice of organization form depends to some extent on
finding default governance rules that best fit the basic relationship
among the owners.

35. Lee, supra note 20, at 936-42.

20011

CHOICE OF FORM AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

89

1. Close CorporationProvisions
Because state legislatures designed close corporation provisions
to deal specifically with the needs of closely held firms it is not clear
why firms largely spurned the provisions. One reason may be that
the provisions did not offer a significant advantage over the
standard corporate form. Statutes that merely clarify enforcement
ofthe firms' customized agreements essentially duplicated what the
cases already were permitting for firms incorporated under the
standard provisions. 6 Statutes that provide for default share
transfer, dissolution and other rules for closely held firms may not
be useful for many firms because of the extra difficulties entailed in
meshing the special close corporation default rules with the firms'
own agreements and with the standard corporate default terms that
continue to apply to closely held firms."
2. LLCs vs. Corporations
Like special close corporation provisions, LLC statutes are better
adapted than standard corporation statutes to closely held firms.
LLC statutes include provisions based on the limited and general
partnership statutes closely held firms long have used. These
include provisions for direct management by owners, default rules
for allocation of profits among owners, restricted transferability of
management rights, and member power to dissociate from the firm.
The statutes eliminate complex formalities and procedures that
create unnecessary costs in closely held firms.

36. See, e.g., Zionv. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (enforingmanagementprovisions
of Delaware corporation despite failure to comply with formalities required by close
corporation provisions); Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1978) (enforcing share
transfer provision in shareholder agreement that did not comply with statute); Boyd, Payne,
Gates & Farthing, P.C. v. Payne, Gates, Farthing & Radd, P.C., 422 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1992)
(law partners who formed a professional corporation for taxpurposes could have their rights
determined according to partnership law, reasoning in part that statutory close corporation
provisions merely codified prior law). Note that Delaware apparently permitted standard
firms to opt out of board management, see DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); to provide
for share transfer restrictions, id. § 202; and clarified that this was not altered by the
existence of a special close corporation subchapter, id. § 356.
37. Ribstein, supra note 5, at 404-06.
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The "chameleon" nature of LLC management permits more
flexibility than may be the case for entrenched corporate rules.
Thus, the agreement may define authority of particular managers
with less risk that the authority will be given by corporate customs
or standards unless the third party is explicitly notified otherwise.
The LLC also permits flexibility over time as well as among firms.
For example, the firm might be manager-managed only until, or
only after, the firm attains designated financial targets. 8
LLCs, like other partnership-type firms, also have greater
financial flexibility than corporations. Each owner's financial rights
can be separately determined through capital account, and these financial rights can be separated from voting rights. This operational
flexibility is also reflected in greater tax flexibility in LLCs and
other partnership-type firms regarding allocating gains and losses
among members. 9 Although this flexibility is difficult to duplicate
in corporations, LLCs can duplicate corporate-type standardization
of interests for trading and other purposes by designating membership interests as units with comparable economic rights. 0
On the other hand, the benefits of the LLC default rules compared with those of corporate form have not always been clear.
LLCs under many statutes41 have the impermanence of the
partnership form and therefore may be more susceptible to hold-up
problems than corporations, where owners have no default right to
"put" their interests back to the firm.4 2 The corporate form also
offers a clearer centralized default management structure than the
"chameleon" LLC form that lets firms elect between centralized and
38. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supranote 26, § 2.03.
39. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.

40. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supranote 26, app. A-4.
41. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, app. 11-1. Some LLC statutes, however,

have adopted corporate-style permanence that makes them more comparable to corporations
and distinguishable from partnerships. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.

42. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 239-40 (1991); Charles &. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close
CorporationContract:ATransactionCostAnalysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216,238 (1992); Larry
E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to PartnerDissociation,65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 377-401
(1987); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waitingfor the Omelet to Set:Match-Specific
Assets andMinority Oppressionin Close Corporations,24 J. CORP. L. 913, 918-20 (1999); see
also Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships,Corporations,and the Theory of The Firm, 88 AM.

ECON. REv. 66 (1998) (discussing hold-up problems in limited partnership where there is a
potential conflict of interest between limited and general partners).
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decentralized management. 3 In other words, the LLCs flexibility
may be a drawback for some firms.
An important question concerning LLC statutes is why they
succeeded while special close corporation provisions failed. The
answer may be that, while LLC statutes provide comprehensive
standard forms, close corporation provisions continue to be part of,
and therefore linked to, standard corporate statutes. Thus, closely
held corporations formed under such provisions were potentially
subject to default statutory rules outside of the close corporation
chapter-rules that were designed for publicly held firms. For
example, courts might apply standard corporate fiduciary duties."
Because remote managers of publicly held firms are agents in the
classic sense of managing other peoples' money they should be
subject to a strong duty of unselfishness. But the conflicts among
the manager/owners of closely held firms who vote their selfinterest rather than delegating control may require different rules.
Ill-fitting default rules may force close corporation owners to engage
in substantial customized planning.
3. LLPs vs. Corporationsand LLCs
LLPs are essentially general partnerships that obtain limited
liability through registration."5 LLPs, like LLCs, therefore offer the
partnership-type default rules discussed above that suit the needs
of closely held firms.
The main advantages of LLPs over LLCs, at least for some firms,
are due to LLPs' clearer resemblance to partnerships. To begin
with, LLPs, like other partnerships, generally do not impose
creditor-protection-type restrictions on distributions as do other
limited liability business association statutes." These restrictions
can be particularly burdensome for service firms that usually
pay out a significant portion of income as compensation to the
43. See generallyRBSTEIN &KEATINGE, supra note 26, § 8.02 (discussing LLC statutory
choice).
44. Larry E. Ribstein, The Closely Held Firm:A View from the United States, 19 MELB.

U. L. REV. 950, 957 (1994).
45. BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 29, §§ 2.01-.09.

46. Id. § 4.04(d).
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professional partners. Indeed, this may be true of most firms that
do not incorporate, since incorporation makes most tax sense for
firms that do not utilize the corporate "inside" tax shelter by
retaining earnings rather than distributing them to owners.' 7
In several other respects, the general partnership default rules
may better suit very closely held and informal firms than LLC
default rules.' First, rules permitting owners to dissociate or
dissolve at will give minority owners an effective veto power, as
compared with the restrictions on exit at will in many LLC
statutes.4 9 Second, partnership unanimity voting on amendments'
better prevents majority owners from changing the agreement over
the minority's objection than majority voting provided for in many
LLC statutes.5 1 Third, sharing according to capital ratios, as is the
case under many LLC statutes,5 2 can disadvantage service
contributors as compared with the rule of equal financial sharing
that prevails in partnerships.5" Fourth, the requirement for a
written agreement, found in many LLC statutes,5 ' may trip up
informal firms.
On the other hand, LLPs' greater similarity to partnerships may
be a disadvantage for some firms as compared with the LLC form.
First, many of the early LLP statutes were so called "partialshield," providing limited liability for torts but not contracts. 55
However, most states have full-shield LLP provisions substantially
mimicking the limited liability of LLCs.58 Second, while
partnerships, and therefore LLPs, are defined as having two or more

47. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
48. See Fallany 0. Stover & Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum:

Advice ForBusinesses Contemplating the Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813 (1999).
49. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, app. 11-1. Note, however, that LLCs initially
were based on the partnership form and many statutes retain exit at will. Id.
50. Revised Unif. P'ship Act § 401(j) (1994), 6 U.L.A. 52 (1995); Unif. P'ship Act § 18(h)
(1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995).
51. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, § 8.03.
52. Id. app. 5-1, at 3.
53. Revised Unif. P'ship Act § 401(b); Unif. P'ship Act § 18(a).
54. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, app. 4-1, at 28.
55. BtOMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, § 3.02.

56. Id. at 157-60 tbl. 3-1 (charting types ofstatutes adopted in each state). It is not clear
how much of a disadvantage the partial shield is because firms can avoid personal liability
for contracts through the contracts themselves.
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9

members,5 7 almost all LLC statutes now explicitly or implicitly
permit for single-member LLCs.5 8
Third, general partnership default rules-particularly regarding
fiduciary duties, decentralized management, transferability, and
dissociation and dissolution-better suit personal liability firms
than those in which owners' liability is limited.59 This unsuitability
is a risk inherent in linking a limited liability business form with
a form characterized by personal liability." For example, since
unlimited liability owners are assumed to be active in the business,
partnership law makes every partner an agent of the firm unless
third parties are notified of a contrary rule.6 ' LLC statutes let firms
opt out of this rule by adopting centralized management," which
better suits some limited liability firms.6 3 Also, the owners' personal
liability justifies a default rule that lets owners end their responsibility for business debts by forcing the firm's dissolution
and liquidation. For reasons discussed above,6 the costs of such
discontinuity may exceed the benefits in limited liability firms.
Although LLPs may opt out of these and other default rules, they
would then lose the advantages of applying the standard partnership form, and would therefore be better off with a standard
form that better accommodates their needs.6 5
B. Tax and Regulation
Federal and state tax and regulatory statutes provide some
explanations for choice of form. If firms choose, for tax and
regulatory reasons, forms whose default rules would be less
57. Revised Unif.P'shipAct § 101(4); Unif P'ship Act § 6.
58. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
59. See BROMBERG & RBSTEIN,supra note 29, §§ 4.01-.08; Larry E. Ribstein, Possible
Futuresfor UnincorporatedFirms, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 319 (1996).
60. See Larry E. Ribstein, Linking Statutory Forms, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1995, at 187 (evaluating linkage of forms).
61. Revised Unif. P'ship Act § 301; Unif. P'ship Act § 9.
62. RISTEIN & KEATINGE, supranote 26, §§ 8.02-.04.
63. LLCs still suffer some uncertainty, however, regarding the ability to isolate agency
powers in particular members. See itL § 8.06.
64. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
65. Moreover, the default ofeasyexitmayhave adverse tax consequences for some firms.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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suitable, this choice points to a cost of such provisions that
lawmakers and regulators could reduce by restructuring the
statutes.
1. Close CorporationStatutes
As discussed below, firms may have tax or regulatory reasons to
incorporate rather than to select one of the other business forms.
These reasons would not lead firms to form under special close
corporation statutes rather than the standard corporate form. At
the same time, these statutes at least provide more favorable
default rules for closely held firms that have other reasons to
incorporate. Of course, to the extent that firms seek to avoid the
corporate form, they would prefer to be LLCs or LLPs.
2. LLCs
The LLC form presents a complex set of tax and regulatory
advantages and disadvantages as compared to corporations and
LLPs.
a. Avoidance of Double Taxation
The conventional tax explanation of LLCs is that they enable
firms to avoid entity-level corporate tax. A corporation taxed under
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code pays tax at the
corporate level, while its owners pay tax on distributions they
receive. In contrast, a partnership taxed under Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code is not taxed at the entity level. Rather, the
firm's income is taxed directly to the owners and losses are
deductible against owners' income from other sources.
Subchapter K applies if the firm is not a "corporation," which the
Code defines to include an "association."6 In Morrissey v.
Commissioner,67 the Supreme Court held that "association" status
66. I.R.C. § 7701(aX2)-(3) (West 2000) (defining "partnership" and "corporation"
respectively).
67. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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depended on a firm's "resemblance" to corporations."8 Prior to 1997,
the IRS interpreted this requirement in the "Kintnerregulations," 6
which provide that a business organization is a corporation and
not a partnership if it has at least three of the "corporate"
characteristics of 'continuity of life, centralized management,
limited liability, and free transferability of interests.70 Although
these rules literally called for taxing a firm that had limited
liability and one other "corporate" characteristic as a partnership,
it was not clear that the IRS would follow this approach as to a new
form of business such as the LLC. A 1988 IRS ruling clearly
permitted this result. 1 The classification rules continued to generate uncertainty, however, and this may have discouraged some
firms from adopting the LLC form.72 Not until the beginning of 1997
did the IRS finally eliminate the tax classification rules and permit
non-publicly traded partnerships to choose to elect taxation as
partnerships or as corporations.73
b. Recognition of Gain or Loss
There are myriad differences cutting many different ways
between corporations and partnership-type firms with regard to
member or shareholder recognition of tax gains and losses in
transactions with the firm. Although an exchange of an asset for an
interest in a corporation usually forces the contributing shareholder to recognize gain or loss,74 a partner or LLC member does
not recognize gain or loss on the contribution in exchange for a
partnership or membership interest.75 Also, while a partner or
68. Id. at 356-58.
69. The name refers to the case that prompted the regulations, United States v. Kintner,
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), in which the IRS unsuccessfully sought to characterize a
professional corporation as a partnership. Id. at 428.
70. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1996). For leading cases interpreting the Kintner
regulations, see Larsonv.Commissioner,66 T.C. 159 (1976); Zuckman v. United States, 524
F.2d 729 (Ct. CL 1975).
71. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360-61.
72. Ribstein, supra note 3, at 461-65.
73. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602).
74. I.R.C. § 1001 (West 2000).
75. I.R.C. § 721(a).
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member who receives property from the firm may have to recognize
gain or loss, the member of a single-member LLC can make a taxfree exchange of the membership interest for the firm's property.7 6
Finally, the Code provides for tax-free reorganizations only between
corporations. This provision has particular relevance for the
owners of a closely-held start-up firm who plan to exit through a
combination with a public corporation. On the other hand, if the
start-up owners exit by incorporating and making an initial public
offering, they need not recognize gain even on a move from
partnership because there is no recognition if the contributors
receive control of the corporation 7 and the interests of public
investors and former partners are combined to determine whether
contributors have control of the corporation immediately after the
contribution.7 9
c. SubchapterS vs. LLC
One problem with explaining the rise of the LLC in federal
income tax terms is that, even before LLCs, limited liability
firms could avoid entity-level taxation by forming Subchapter S
corporations. Since only "corporations" are eligible for Subchapter
S treatment, 0 this election affects choice of form under state law.
To be sure, Subchapter S included numerous eligibility restrictions,
most notably on number of owners and classes of stock.8 Assuming
a firm is eligible for either Subchapter S or Subchapter K treatment, 82 the tradeoffs involved in the choice are complex.
d. Step-up in Basis
When a partner or an LLC member, but not an S Corporation
shareholder, dies or redeems her interest, the tax basis of the
76. Priv. Ltr. RuL 97-51-012 (Sept. 15, 1997).
77. I.R.C. § 368.
78. I.R.C. § 351.
79. Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141-42.
80. I.R.C. § 1361.
81. See supranotes 17-18 and accompanying text.
82. Note that a state law corporation cannot elect to be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1996).
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partner's or member's interest in the firm can be stepped up, thus
avoiding tax on the appreciation." Firms may somewhat offset this
advantage of LLCs by tax planning.8 4
e. Pass-throughof Losses

S Corporations are somewhat less able than Subchapter K firms
to pass losses through to individual owners, but the differences
between S Corporations and LLCs in this regard are complex and
subtle. This pass-through has been described as particularly
important for real estate firms, and has been used to explain the
relatively small number of S Corporations that are real estate
firms. 5 But it is not clear that LLCs are much better off in this
regard. Owners of both K and S firms can deduct losses up to the
tax basis of their interests in S Corporation stock and debt. A
shareholder's basis in Subchapter S debt includes only loans that
the shareholder made, while the owner's basis in a Subchapter K
firm includes her share of all of the firm's debt not classified as
"non-recourse."8 6 However, in contrast to standard-form partnerships, LLC members' limited liability makes the firm's debts "nonrecourse" to the owners unless the owners assume the liabilities.8 7
LLC owners have an advantage over Subchapter S corporation
owners in that the former are "at risk" for purposes of using the
firm's losses, deductions, and credits if they guarantee the firm's
obligations. 8 On the other hand, LLC members may be considered
to have non-deductible "passive losses" 9 unless they spend the
83. I.R.C. § 743 (stating general rule on optional adjustment of basis); I.R.C. § 754
(stating manner ofelecting optional adjustment of basis); Lee, supranote 20, at 895-96,928.
See generally Susan Kalinka, Death ofa Member of an LLC, 57 LA. L. REv. 451, 456 (1997)
(describing the method of adjusting an LLC member's basis on death).
84. S Corporation shareholders can sell or distribute the firm's assets and then liquidate
the S Corporation in the same year through a "somewhat Byzantine technique," Lee, supra
note 20, at 896, that would seem to be impracticable for the less sophisticated firms that use
Subchapter S to avoid complication.
85. Id. at 895, 941.
86. I.R.C. § 752(a).
87. RIBSTEiN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, §§ 17.09-.10.
88. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-22(c)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,235 (June 5, 1979); RIBSTEIN
& KEATINGE, supranote 26, § 17.12.
89. I.R.C. § 469.
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requisite number of hours working in the business, but an S
Corporation owner may be able to deduct losses even without
meeting this test.9"
f Built-in Gains and Losses
Cutting in the opposite direction from the previous two points,
Subchapter K owners, but not S Corporation owners, are subject to
rules requiring allocation to contributing members of unrealized
gains or losses in contributed property.91
g. PartnershipFlexibility
The rigidity of the Subchapter S form may be costly for some
firms. Partnerships, including LLCs, can allocate income,
deductions, and credits in any manner provided in the partnership
agreement provided that allocation has "substantial economic
effect" or accords with the partner's interest in the partnership.92
This flexibility can be particularly important in firms that want
to reward specific owners' financial and service contributions.
However, an S corporation that makes such payments may be
creating a second class of stock and thereby losing its S corporation
status.93
h. SubchapterS Certainty
Flexibility is not always a good thing. The tax certainty of the
Subchapter S form might be attractive for the simplest firms for
which the cost of potential tax error exceeds the costs of the oneclass-of-stock constraint. As long as firms play by the wellestablished Subchapter S rules, they will not be subject to tax
penalties such as those imposed under the "anti-abuse" rules.9 '
90. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supranote 26, §§ 2.18, 17.13.
91. I.R.C. § 704(c).
92. I.R.C. § 704(b).
93. I.R.C. § 1361(bX)(1D) (requiring a "small business corporation" have only one class
of stock); I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2) (providing for termination of Subchapter S status on
corporation's ceasing to be a "small business corporation").
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995).
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However, even as to simplicity the tradeoffs are complex. The
rigidity of the S Corporation qualifications means that firms must.
be careful to operate so as not to lose their Subchapter S eligibility
-for example, by unwittingly creating a second class of stock
through an employment agreement. In contrast, use of Subchapter
K depends largely on election under "check-the-box. 5 Although it
may be easier to go astray in setting up a Subchapter K firm than
in setting up a Subchapter S firm, a small firm is more likely to
have good legal advice at the outset than throughout its operation.9"
These differences between S Corporations and LLCs suggest that
some firms would be better off as LLCs than as Subchapter S firms
while others would be better off as S Corporations. For all these
firms, tax considerations operate at the margin together with the
other factors this Part discusses.
i. "Inside"Tax Shelter for Retained Earnings
Although LLCs may have a tax advantage over Subchapter C
Corporations in terms of avoidance of entity-level taxation,
Subchapter C offers an "inside" tax shelter for corporate earnings
retained in the business. Subchapter C corporations may be abetter
tax vehicle overall for some firms than LLCs or other Subchapter
K entities where (1) the owners are taxed at high marginal rates;97
(2) the firm retains substantial earnings; (3) the firm can eliminate
much of its corporate income through deductions, particularly
including high salary deductions for active owners;98 and (4) the
owners can delay realizing capital gains taxes by holding the stock
for a long time. One writer goes so far as to say that "double
taxation'9 is either an unwitting or 'briar patch' argument in most
9

cases."

There are, however, many firms that do not meet these
qualifications, particularly including real estate and other firms
95. See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
96. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, § 2.13.
97. Lee, supranote 20, at 910. This depends on the corporate and individual graduated
income tax schedules and the division of corporate income. Id. at 914.
98. I.R.C. § 162(a), (m)(providing for salary deduction).
99. Lee, supranote 20, at 921 (footnote omitted).
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with substantial non-operating assets, and personal service firms.
These firms, including many partnerships and LLCs, lack business
reasons for retaining income and indeed, as in the real estate
business, may generate tax losses through depreciation. 1" These
facts, coupled with data showing that the growth in LLC formations
has not been accompanied by a decline in incorporations," 1 and the
unlikelihood that business formations generally have declined, 2
suggest that, for tax reasons, LLCs are replacing general partnerships but not corporations.
The income tax story, however, is inconclusive. As already noted
regarding Subchapter S corporations, tax factors operate on the
margin together with the other factors discussed in this Part.10 3 For
example, many firms that have moderate retained earnings and
middle-bracket owners may have been marginally better off as C
Corporations under the prior limited liability and tax classification
regime but better off now as LLCs. Moreover, as discussed above,
many firms that can choose between the LLC or Subchapter S
forms probably would be better off from a tax standpoint as LLCs.
Accordingly, tax considerations may not fully explain many choiceof-form decisions.
j. Estate and Gift Taxes
The owner of a closely held family corporation can minimize the
value of interests in the firm for estate and gift tax purposes by
restricting distributions. The further into the future the distributions must be discounted, the lower the valuation of the interest,
other things being equal. Owners thereby can pass interests in the
business to children or other relatives without triggering significant
tax liability. This is tricky in a partnership, however, because
minority owners under general partnership default rules have
the
power to cause the firm to liquidate, thereby triggering a distribution. The Code and regulations provide that the firm cannot solve
100. Id. at 923-24.
101. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
102. The data was collected over a period of significant economic growth in the United
States.
103. See supra notes 66-96 and accompanying text.
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this problem simply by amending its agreement to restrict
liquidation rights.' Although a "restriction imposed, or required to
be imposed, by any Federal or State law" matters for valuation,0 5
the IRS may disregard a restriction that is "more restrictive than
the limitations that would apply under the State law generally
applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction."10 6 Thus,
a provision in a limited partnership or LLC agreement prohibiting
member withdrawal or liquidation would be ineffective for tax
purposes if more restrictive than the applicable state statute. A
firm therefore may be better off for estate and gift tax purposes as
a corporation than as a partnership-type firm depending on the
applicable law. States, however, are rapidly eliminating this choiceof-form consideration for most limited partnerships and LLCs by
amending their statutes to provide for restrictions meeting the
standards of the IRC.'0 7
k. Deductionfor FringeBenefits
One reason for forming a corporation rather than an LLC or other
unincorporated business historically has been that the former can
fully deduct some employee benefits such as premiums for group
health, accident and life insurance that the employees receive
tax free, while S Corporations and LLCs currently can only
partially deduct premiums paid on behalf of certain owneremployees.'0 8 This difference, however, is being eliminated as full
deductions are phasing in for S Corporations and Subchapter K

firms.109

104. I.R.C. § 2704 (West 2000).
105. I.R.C. § 2704(bX3XB).
106. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992).
107. See ALAN R.BRomERG&LARRYE. RSTEN, BROMBEG&RiBsTEnON PARTNERSHP
§ 17.02(d)(2), at 17.32 n.21 (1988 & Supp. 2001) (discussing limited partnership provisions);
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supranote 26, app. 11-1 (charting LLC statutes).
108. Booth, supranote 5, at 546-47; Lee, supra note 20, at 907-08.
109. I.R.C. § 162(1) (limiting the deduction of partnerships and S corporations for health
insurance to 60% of the amount paid forhealth insurance ofself-employedpersons (including
certain individual members) in 1999 through 2001, 70% in 2002, and 100% in years after
2002).
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1. Wage and Self-employment Taxes
A significant disadvantage of LLCs and other partnership-type
firms as compared with corporations, including S Corporations, is
that the owners of the former are more likely than the latter to
have to include their shares of the firm's income as net earnings
from self-employment for wage or self-employment tax purposes." 0
Although the IRS proposed regulations in 1997 that would have
clarified when LLC owners would be treated like limited partners
and therefore not subject to the tax,"' Congress suspended the
effect of these regulations," thereby placing LLCs in limbo on
this issue and providing a tax incentive to organize as a Subchapter
S Corporation rather than an LLC."' Of course, firms must
weigh this incentive against the other costs and benefits of
corporate status, including Subchapter S taxation, as compared
with Subchapter K taxation discussed above.
m. State Taxes
States may influence the choice of form by imposing franchise or
similar taxes on some types of entities but not others. For example,
Florida, Pennsylvania and Texas imposed corporate income taxes
on LLCs during much of the period of the development of LLCs,
although Florida and Pennsylvania dropped their taxes for LLCs,
but not on LLPs, during the relevant period." 4 Connecticut taxes
corporations but not LLCs."5

110. I.R.C. § 1402 (requiring partners to treat their distributive shares of partnership
income as net earnings from self-employment subject to old age, survivors, and disability
tax).
111. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997).
112. Taxpayer ReliefAct of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935,111 Stat. 788 (1997) (providing
that "[n]o temporary or final regulation with respect to the definition of a limited partner
under section 1402(aX13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be issued or made
effective before July 1, 1998").
113. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, §17.19, at 146 n.50-51; Lee, supra note 20, at
935-36 & n.269.
114. Bruce P. Ely & Christopher R. Grissom, LLC andLLPScorecard:An Update, 88 TAx
NOTES 815 (Aug. 7, 2000) (summarizing state-by-state differences).
115. Id.
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n. State and FederalRegulationof Business Entities
State and federal regulation may apply to specific types of
business entities, or may apply to business entities generally, but
based on features that some types are more likely to have than
others. The former type of regulation varies so erratically among
business forms, laws and jurisdictions that it is unlikely to have
had a systematic effect on choice of form, with the possible
exception of professional regulation discussed in the next subsection.
o. Regulation Based on Featuresof Firms'Particular
FederalEmployment Discriminationand Securities Laws
In general, these laws are intended to protect relatively
unsophisticated individuals who have been harmed by firms with
which they deal at arm's length as investors or employees. Strong
arguments can be made for applying these statutes based on firms'
choice of entity for greater predictability and because the entity's
default rules are important."' However, many courts at least
purport to apply something like an "economic reality" test that
looks beyond choice of form to the actual terms and circumstances
of specific firms." 7 Accordingly, state or federal regulation probably

is having little effect on choice of form.
3. LLPs
Most of the tax and regulatory factors discussed above regarding
LLCs also apply to LLPs. In particular, both are taxed under
Subchapter K and therefore differ in the same way from
corporations taxed under Subchapters C and S. Indeed, the
similarity of LLPs and LLCs is central to the data discussed below

116. See Larry E. Ribstein, FormandSubstancein the Definitionofa Security'. The Case
of Limited Liability Companies,51 WASIL & LEE L. REv. 807 (1994).
117. See generallyBROMBERG&RISTEIN, supranote 29, § 7.03(a) (discussing partners as
"employees under employment discrimination7 laws).
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in Part III. This section discusses only the salient tax and
regulatory differences between the two forms.
a. Estate and Gift Taxes
The linkage between LLPs and general partnership law may be
a disadvantage for some firms attempting to avoid estate and gift
taxes. 118 General partnership statutes, unlike many LLC and
limited partnership statutes, continue to provide for dissolution and
dissociation at the will of any partner.'19 This reflects partners'
need in standard form partnerships to terminate their personal
liability for the firm's debts. Accordingly, these firms cannot rely on
restrictions on liquidation rights that would apply under state law.
b. Wage and Self-employment Taxes
The more pronounced member-management of
LLPs means
120
tax.
self-employment
to
exposure
more
marginally
c. Cash Method Accounting
Many smaller firms, particularly personal service firms, gain if
they can account for tax purposes on a cash basis. LLPs offer
somewhat greater
assurance that the firm will be able to use the
12 1
cash method.

d. State Taxes
Three states, Florida, Pennsylvania and Texas, imposed
corporate income taxes on LLCs but not on LLPs during the relevant period. 122 Indeed, the LLP's invention in Texas may be at least
partly attributable to this fact.
118. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
119. Revised Unif. P'ship Act §§ 601,801 (1994), 6 U.L.A. 72,92 (1995); Unif. P'ship Act
§§ 29, 31 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 752, 771 (1995).
120. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, § 7.05(e).

121. Id. § 7.05(d).
122. See supranote 114 and accompanying text.
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e. State and FederalRegulation of Business Entities
To the limited extent that unincorporated entities can escape
regulation aimed mainly at corporations, LLPs may provide a
marginal benefit over LLCs because the former are more clearly
partnerships. The regulatory advantage is mainly important under
statutes and rules that authorize use of the LLP, but not the LLC,
form by lawyers.'
C. Switching Costs
A fourth factor in choice of form is the costs that existing (as
opposed to new) firms incur switching from one form to another. For
example, firms that had already offered bondholders takeover
protection based on putting the bonds at par would find it hard to
offer a subsequent class more precise protection only from takeoverrelated interest rate fluctuations.1' This is a form of path
dependence, in which firms have efficiently adapted to initial
conditions but are less suited to subsequent conditions than other
hypothetical alternatives that are too costly to adopt.' With
respect to choice of organizational form, switching costs include the
costs of redesigning agreements and accounting for the new format,
getting member agreement, making legally required filings, taxes
due as a result of the conversion, and the effect of the switch on
existing contracts or assets subject to restrictions on transfer.

123. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16101(6) (West Supp. 2001) (permitting formation of LLPs for
practice of profession); Act of June 6, 1996, S.B. No. 141, § 30, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 57,
at 213, 239 (West) (providing that nothing in the LLC act shall be construed to allow a LLC
to render professional services); R.I. Sup. Ct. art. II, R. 10(a) (1999) (permitting lawyers to
practice as professional corporations or LLPs but not authorizing LLCs). See generally
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supranote 29, § 7.04(a) (discussing professional LLPs); RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supranote 26, § 15.13 (discussing professional LLCs).
124. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate

Contracting(or "The Economics of Boilerplate),83 VA. L. REV. 713, 728 (1997).
125. For discussions of categories of path dependence based on whether the initial and
subsequent equilibria are suboptimal, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995); Mark J. Roe,

Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L. REV. 641, 647-53
(1996).
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1. Close CorporationStatutes
In addition to any election necessary to become a statutory close
corporation,1 6 a firm may incur costs in revising its charter or other
agreements to mesh with the statute. A corporation, on the other
hand, switching to close corporation status does not change entity
form, and therefore does not trigger tax or other consequences that
might follow from change in form.
2. LLCs
One reason LLCs seem to have come mainly out of the ranks of
partnerships rather than corporations 127 may be that switching
costs are higher on moving from corporate than from partnership
form. This involves three types of costs. First, the move from the
corporate standard form to a standard form based largely on
partnership involves a more significant change in background rules
than the move from one partnership-type business to another. This
may entail somewhat higher costs of rewriting the parties'
agreement to mesh with the new form. For example, corporate
shares are fully transferable by default while partners may freely
transfer only their financial interests. Accordingly, share transfer
agreements that make sense in corporations may not make sense
for partnerships.
Second, the continuity of the underlying entity may matter for
purposes such as continuation of the firm's contracts. Statutory
provisions permitting partnerships to convert into LLCs without
changing the underlying entity long have been common.m A
conversion involves transforming a single business from one entity
form to another, and therefore emphasizes the continuity of the
business. 129 Indeed, statutory conversion provisions commonly state
that the new entity is the same for all purposes as the old one. 3 ' If,
126. E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 344 (1991 & Supp. 2000).
127. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
128. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, app. 11-1, at 20 (tabulating state provisions).

129. Id. § 11.16.
130. E.g., Revised Unif P'ship Act § 904 (1994), 6 U.L.A. 111 (1995) (governing conversion
of limited partnership to partnership).
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however, the applicable corporation statute does not provide for
conversion, firms that seek to disincorporate into LLCs may have
to distribute corporate assets to owners or directly to an LLC. This
clearly involves two separate entities, and therefore little likelihood that the successor will be treated as the continuation of the
predecessor in the absence of a contrary statutory provision. Some
statutes permit mergers between LLCs and corporations,13 ' but
even this involves two previously separate entities rather than a
change in form of a clearly continuous business. Moreover, even if
the statute technically permits corporations to convert into LLCs,
it is not clear an LLC actually will be treated as the "same entity"
as the predecessor corporation.'3 2
Third, and most importantly, a corporation/LLC switch is likely
to involve higher tax costs than a partnership/LLC switch. The IRS
has ruled that partnerships converting to LLCs do not terminate
solely by reason of the conversion.' An LLC/corporate merger,
however, is likely to cause both the corporation and its shareholders
13 4
to recognize gain.

3. LLPs
As with a close corporation election, an existing partnership
incurs decision-making costs and potential costs of redrafting its
131. RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supranote 26, app. 11-1, at 18-19 (tabulating LLC statutory
provisions).
132. There maybe some question whether even a partnership-LLC conversion alway will
be given this effect, as where a third party contract explicitly provides for termination on
change of entity form whether by conversion or any othermechanism. Id. § 11.16. The point
is that these questions are likely to be greater for corporate-LLC conversions than for
partnership-LLC conversions.
133. Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130.
134. RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supra note 26,§ 17.16; I.R.C. § 331 (West2000) (providingthat
amounts received on complete liquidation of corporation are treated as in full payment for
stock), § 336 (providing for recognition of gain or loss on complete liquidation), § 1001
(providing for determination of gain or loss); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9701029 (January 3, 1997)
(providing that
"merger of a corporation into an LLC is treated as a transfer by the corporation ofits assets
to LLC in exchange for LLCs assumption of the corporation's liabilities and the corporation's
receipt of interests in the LLC, followed by distribution of the LLC interests to the
shareholders in a taxable liquidation ofthe corporation under IRC § 331") (quoting RIBSTEIN
& KEATINGE, supranote 26, § 17.16, at 107).
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agreement when registering as an LLP,3 5 but does not incur the tax
or other costs of moving to a new business entity.3 6 In contrast to
partnerships switching to LLC form, which involves at least a
conversion from one form to another, an LLP remains a general
partnership. This continuity is particularly important for professional firms, which historically have been organized as partnerships, and which usually have more elaborate agreements than
typical general partnerships. A corporation switching to LLP form
would incur costs similar to those of a corporation becoming an
LLC.
D. Network Externalities
Scholars have asserted that "network externalities" can impede
the development of new products or services.'37 Sales of the product
or service depend on the value other users add. A competitor may
be unable to dislodge even an inferior product that has a valuable
user network. For example, some argue that network externalities
account for the success of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard over
the allegedly superior Dvorak alternative. 8 This theory has been
asserted in recent legal cases involving the antitrust and copyright
laws. 13 9 Most importantly for present purposes, commentators have
135. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. Some revisions may, however, be
desirable to reflect the firm's limited liability. BROMBERG& RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, § 1.05.
136. From a tax standpoint, when a partnership converts to an LLP, the conversion in
itself does not cause a termination of the partnership under I.R.C. § 708, and for federal
income tax purposes the LLP is simply a continuation of the partnership. Id. § 7.05(c);
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, § 17.16.
137. For general discussions ofnetwork externalities, see Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Standardization,Compatibility, and Innovation, RAND J. ECON., Spring 1985, at 70, 71-72
(characterizing the problem as one of excess inertia); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 108
(discussing how network effects "retard innovation").
138. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985).
139. The most prominent recent example is the use of the theory in the government's
antitrust case against Microsoft, where prosecutors relied on a network externality theory
to establish the relevant market. See STANJ. LIEBOwrrZ& STEPHENE. MARGOLIS, WINNERS,
LOSERS, & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999); John E.
Lopatka and William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and
Economics of Exclusion, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 168-71 (1999). For a discussion of this
issue in the copyright context, see Lotus Development Corp. v. BorlandInternational,Inc.,

49 F.3d. 807, (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Some

20011

CHOICE OF FORM AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

109

asserted that network externalities can impede the development of
business associations" 0 just as they can new products and services.
This subpart discusses the network externalities generally, and also
in relation to the specific phenomena concerning close corporation
statutes, LLCs and LLPs that this Article is attempting to explain.
1. Network ExternalitiesandAlternative Explanations
Business associations, including the statutory provisions, cases
and forms based on each business association, exhibit some network
characteristics that appear only after other people decide to use
them. First, courts interpret ambiguous terms in all similar
contracts."" Second, common practices such as investment banker
fairness opinions emerge, implementing contract terms.'42 Third,
legal services may be standardized and their cost reduced after
parties gain experience in drafting and after books and continuing
legal education materials explain contractual terms. 13 These
benefits help reduce errors of ambiguity, inconsistency and incompleteness in contract terms.' Fourth, wide use of the terms

Economic Considerationsin the Intellectual PropertyProtectionof Software, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 321, 351-57 (1995).
140. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of PathDependence in Corporate
Ownershipand Governance,52 STAN. L.REV. 127 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
AntitakeoverProvisionsinBonds:BondholderProtectionorManagementEntrenchment?,
40
UCLAL. REv. 931(1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael Kausner, PathDependence in Corporate
Contracting:IncreasingReturns,HerdBehaviorandCognitiveBiases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,
351-58,363-66 (1996) [hereinafterKahan&KlausnerPathDependence;
Kahan & Klausner,
supranote 124; Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, andNetworks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Wortman, supranote 15, at 1386-87. For writings critical ofthis
application of network externalities theory, see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law
and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REv. 813 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implicationsof Network EconomicEffects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 562-86 (1998).
141. Klausner, supra note 140, at 774; see also ia at 776 (noting that the case law
interpretation of a contract "embeds that interpretation in the contracts of all firms that use
the same term").
142. Id. at 780.
143. Id. at 782-84.
144. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:An Analysis of
the InteractionsBetween Express andImplied Contract Terms, 73 CAL L. REV. 261, 286-89
(1985).
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may help the firm in capital markets because of pricing and signaling effects.' 45
It is important to distinguish "network benefits" from "network
externalities." A network benefit occurs when the advantages of a
particular product or standard increase with the number of users.
For example, the private benefit of a telephone increases with the
number of persons it can reach. Network benefits can also be
"externalities" because new adopters of the standard or service
consider only their own benefits and not those they would confer on
other users by adopting the product or standard. Also, because of
risk and the time value of money, future network benefits are worth
less to early adopters than to later ones.' People therefore may not
buy a new product or adopt a new standard even if it is better than
the current one apart from network benefits, and a new product or
standard might not emerge even if it might have given rise to a
superior network but for externalities.
With respect to business associations, firms may fail to adopt a
new standard form'4 7 or adopt an existing standard form even if the
alternative standard form would better suit their needs. 14' An
example might be large corporations' long-term use of Delaware law
in order to take advantage of judicial and legal expertise and other
benefits they expect the Delaware legal "network" to continue to
produce. 149 It is not clear whether some other statute might have
greater benefits for many firms, and might generate a superior
network in the absence of externalities. Note that there are
possibilities other than a failure to move from a suboptimal to an
optimal network: the optimal equilibrium may involve something
other than the same choice of statute by all firms; network
externalities theoretically might prevent any standard from
developing as distinguished from preventing a move from one
standard to another; or network externalities may not prevent firms
from moving to the optimal equilibrium. 50
145. Klausner, supranote 140, at 785-86.
146. I& at 790.
147. Id. at 814-15.
148. Id. at 807-08.
149. Id. at 844-47.
150. As Michael Klausner notes, "the point here is not that a suboptimal equilibrium wi!l
prevail, but that such an equilibrium may prevail." Id. at 810. He notes that this may be
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The network externalities analysis has several possible
normative implications for the law of business associations. In
general, if there is a market failure because unfettered state
competition cannot be assumed to produce efficient results, it
arguably follows that academics, uniform lawmakers and others
should intercede to help the law along. First, the fact that parties
cannot necessarily choose the standard form they want means that
courts might interpret existing contracts, including parties'
adoption of standard forms, based on what the parties seemed to
want rather than what they actually selected.' 5 ' Second, if diverse
firms are likely to gravitate toward uniform standards, perhaps
legislatures should draft open-ended default provisions that judges
can tailor to individual cases 52 or offer menus of alternative rules
in order to promote optimal diversity. 3 Third, the law might
respond to the problem of sub-optimal diversity by promoting
uniform statutes. This suggests a role for institutions such as the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Rules promulgated by
these organizations could overcome network externalities by
serving as a "focal" provision that new users adopt because they
expect others to gravitate toward it.' 5 '

difficult or impossible to determine. Id. at 810-15.
151. Id. at 814. For example, in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993),
the Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt a special rule for close corporation
shareholders, partly because the parties failed to opt for treatment under the Delaware close
corporation provisions. Since the standard-form corporation has a much largeruser network
than the little-used statutory close corporation, however, there is a question whether
network concerns effectively foreclosed the close corporation as a realistic option, and
therefore whether users should be penalized by their choice.
152. See Klausner, supra note 140, at 831-32.
153. See id. at 83741. For evidence on uniformity in LLC statutes, see Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the
Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996).
154. SeeKlausner, supranote 140, at 800,804. SeegenerallyECRASMUSSEN,GAMESAND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAmE THEORY 36 (1989) (noting that a focal point is an
example of a Nash equilibrium in which no player will deviate from cooperation as long as
the other players do not deviate); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58
(1980) (discussing focal points). For discussions of uniform laws as focal points, see LEA
BR.MAyER, CoNFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONs, 155-85 (1991); Larry
E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 139-40 (1996).
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The wisdom of these alternatives as solutions to network
externalities depends, of course, on whether there is a problem to
be solved. In the first place, network externalities may not be a
factor at all. Business associations may not actually involve clear
network characteristics. Interpretive judicial rulings, common
practices such as investment banker fairness opinions,
standardized services and pricing, and signaling effects would be
most important where terms are open-ended or complex enough to
require clarification, and an interpretation has value for many
users in the network. Yet there may not be many such terms
because courts often tailor open-ended terms, such as fiduciary
duties for specific applications, so that an interpretation in one case
has little value for others. 5 Moreover, any network benefits that
exist may not increase with the number of users.'56 With respect to
clarification provided by case law, litigation may occur too
infrequently to provide much clarification irrespective of the
number of users,'57 and in any event more cases do not necessarily
provide more clarity because courts may reach inconsistent results.
Even if business associations have network characteristics, these
may not involve externalities.A problem with identifying network
externalities is that others besides individual users might
internalize the benefits of creating a new standard. 15 In general,
entrepreneurs can help shape users' expectations by convincing
potential users that a new form is likely to become a standard.
These expectations, in turn, determine whether users will adopt
or shun a new form.' 59 With respect to business associations,
academics and practitioners can earn reputational and other
benefits by encouraging the development of network benefits
relating to standard forms.160 Thus, lawyers might promote a new
business association such as the LLC to have a new product to sell.
155. Lemley & McGowan, supranote 140, at 571-72.

156. Klausner assumes both that network benefits grow in a linear fashion over time as
more users are added, and that these increases occur indefinitely. Klausner, supranote 140,
at 793 n.119.
157. Lemley & McGowan, supranote 140, at 572-73.
158. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supranote 125.
159. Klausner, supra note 140, at 800, 802-03, 805.
160. Cf Lemley & McGowan, supra note 140, at 578; Ribstein, supra note 5, at 392-95,
400-01.
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They can hold continuing legal education programs on the use of a
new standard form, which states in effect subsidize by requiring or
encouraging lawyers to participate. Lawyers also can write books
and articles that help in the interpretation and use of new forms.
Private groups such as the state bar may internalize the benefits of
promoting these statutes.1 6 Lawyers also earn reputational benefits
from drafting and lobbying for new legislation.6 2 Moreover, as with
the LLP, the move to a new standard can be facilitated by linking
or bundling it with an existing standard form in order to utilize
case law and other interpretive materials. This is analogous to
engineering a new product with backward compatibility or
convertibility features or bundling it with another product. 63
Although those who believe network externalities are an important
phenomenon might argue that the devices just discussed indicate
the presence of a network externality problem that must be solved,
it might be argued with equal force that the easy availability of
such solutions indicates that there was never any problem.
Even if network externalities exist, they may not explain why
firms fail to move to a new form. Failure to move to a new standard
may be attributable to the suitability of the default rules of the
standard form firms adopt. 64 For example, the QWERTY/Dvorak
story on which the network externalities theory originally was
based broke down upon a closer examination of the factual background. Liebowitz and Margolis demonstrated that the evidence for
Dvorak's superiority was weak, and that QWERTY won only after

161. See William J. Carney, The Production of CorporateLaw, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715
(1998); Klausner, supranote 140, at 841.
162. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supranote 154, at 144-45; Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws, and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 947, 959-61 (1995). In general, these activities may arise because lawyers have a kind
ofproperty right in the law of their jurisdictions in the sense that licensing rules restrict free
entry of other lawyers. Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers' Property Rights in State Law (Nov. 27,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William and Mary Law Review). Of course,
government may want to limit the extent to which lawyers or anyone else has such property
rights in law so as to internalize the costs of moving to a new standard. For example,
property rights in legal precedentmay be inefficient because this would cause legal precedent
to help the "owner" and hurt others. From this standpoint, some network externalities may
be socially efficient. We are indebted to D. Bruce Johnsen for this point.
163. Gillette, supra note 140, at 820; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 140, at 496.
164. See Klausner, supra note 140, at 813-14.
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proving itself against competing standards. 65 Similarly, Liebowitz
and Margolis have attributed Microsoft's dominance in the software
market to the superiority of their products, which weakens the
argument for network externalities in this context as well. 16 As
discussed above in Subparts A and B, comparing the benefits of the
default rules of various standard forms, with and without taking
tax and regulation into account, is a complex enterprise.
These problems are evident in the examples proposed by Michael
Klausner, the leading proponent of the network externalities theory
in the context ofbusiness associations. Klausner argues that Silicon
Valley entrepreneurs' apparent reluctance to use the partnership
form despite the evident tax advantages because of their unfamiliarity with partnership equivalents to stock options 1 67 shows
the importance of network marketing benefits because employees
would be more comfortable with the partnership form as its use
grew. 1 68 But these firms might have used the standard corporate
form for other reasons. They may have wanted the assurance of
limited liability, particularly given the risk inherent in a start-up.
Although they could incorporate under Subchapter S and obtain
partnership-type taxation, this would be subject to the various costs
of the Subchapter S form discussed above, including the limitations
imposed by the one-class-of-stock limitation. 169 Or the parties might
have been concerned that the greater impermanence of the partnership form exposes the members to the risk of opportunistic
withdrawal of capital. 170 In short, use of the corporate form might
reflect the higher benefits of that form's default rules rather than
network externalities.

165. S. J. IAebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1990); see also LIEBowrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 139 (showing evidence that Microsoft's
victory in software markets is due to the superiority of their products rather than network
externalities); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality:An Uncommon
Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133 (arguing for limited application of the theory
of network externalities as market failures).
166. LIEBOWrrZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 139.
167. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Startups, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1737(1994).
168. Klausner, supranote 140, at 821-22.

169. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Failure to move to a new form also may be attributable simply to
a lack of foresight, mistake, cognitive biases or agency costs rather
than network externalities. The choice of form may be simply a
mistake in the sense that it is the wrong form even taking into
account the above constraints. Or lawyers may cause excessive
standardization because their incentives differ from those of
their clients.'71 Lawyers may receive relatively little reward for
successful innovation, but suffer significant losses to their nondiversiflable human capital.'72 Also, lawyers and accountants might
not capture enough individual rewards to compensate them for
retooling to handle new forms. The market may be imperfectly
informed about the quality of the lawyer's efforts and evaluate the
lawyer based only on whether her actions, or the outcomes from
these actions, diverged from those of other lawyers.173 Thus, the
lawyer's self-optimizing course may be to conform even if this is not
best for the client.'74 To be sure, this cause of lock-in blends with
network externalities because a larger network and more information reduce lawyers' risk. But focusing on lawyers' incentives
may point to fixing the lawyer-client relationship rather than the
underlying legal rules.
With respect to cognitive biases and lock-in, Klausner and Kahan
focus on the status quo, anchoring and conformity biases and the
endowment effect, which refer to tendencies to favor present states,
group judgments and initial "reference points," and to prefer what
the actor now owns. 5 As with lawyer-client agency costs, cognitive
171. Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence,supra note 140, at 353-55; Edward L. Rubin,
The Phenomenologyof Contract:Complex Contractingin the EntertainmentIndustry, 152J.
INSTL & THEOR'L ECON. 123, 135 (1996); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing TheResults: The Role ofLawyers in TransmittingLegalRules,5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997) (discussing overstatement of risk as a type of agency cost).
172. This is related to the phenomenon of "maverick" risk as applied to pension fund
fiduciaries. The business judgment rule may make fiduciaries reluctant to follow investment
policies that depart from industry standards even if they are value-increasing because their
liability and market exposure outweigh the private benefits of a successful maverick policy.
We are indebted to D. Bruce Johnsen for this analogy.
173. Kahan & Klausner, PathDependence, supra note 140, at 356-8. Note that the lack
of information may itself be attributable to network effects, thereby further entangling
network externalities with other causes.
174. On the other hand, innovating lawyers may be able to earn sufficient fees to
compensate them for the risks of being first movers. Indeed, lawyers' conservatism might
counter-balance their incentive to drive up fees through excessive innovation.
175. Kalan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supranote 140, at 359-65 (citing the literature
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and judgment biases may be hard to separate from network
externalities because they may turn out to be learning or network
effects. 176 Also, even if the problem is identified, the normative
prescription may be unclear. Because legislators, courts and regulators are subject to the same biases, the best solution may be to
simply let the market minimize the effect of the biases by clarifying
the costs of sticking with inferior solutions.
Finally, even if network externalities prevent a move to new
form, the resulting equilibrium may be optimal. A new standard
might attract users from an optimal existing standard by offering
short-term benefits. A bandwagon attributable to the creation of a
new network might then cause a general move to the new standard.
It might be better ifnetwork externalities prevented the suboptimal
77

move.1

The ambiguities concerning the network externalities hypothesis
will be discussed in the following subsections with respect to the
phenomena on which our analysis focuses.
2. Close CorporationStatutes
One commentator attributes rejection of special close corporation
statutes to firms' being locked-in to the standard corporate form by
its established network of cases and practices.' 78 However, firms'
failure to move to these statutes might be attributable to the costs
and uncertainties of close corporation statutes discussed above in
Subpart A.
3. LLCs
Network externalities seem to be an impediment to acceptance
of the LLC form. The benefits of the LLC discussed above in
Subpart A, including flexible financial structure and standard form
on these phenomena).
176. Id at 365.
177. Thus, lock-in maybe analogous to arguments for the efficiency ofentry barriers. See
Harold Demsetz, Barriersto Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982); C. C. von Weizsricker, A
Welfare Analysis ofBarriersto Entry, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 399 (1980).
178. See Wortman, supra note 15, at 1379 & n.71 (citing Robert C. Clark, CoRPORATE LAW
§ 1.3, at 29 (1986)).

2001]

CHOICE OF FORM AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

117

governance structures that can fit both direct member-managed
and centrally managed firms, also can be viewed as costs in the
sense that there is no partnership or corporate network of rules,
cases and forms on which firms, third parties and courts can draw
for clarification. For example, many terms in LLC statutes have no
case law interpreting them, and there are uncertainties concerning
how many regulatory statutes in areas such as employment
discrimination, securities law and bankruptcy law should be
applied to LLCs. The important question regarding LLCs is
whether externalities associated with moving to a new network
inhibited firms from taking advantage of the beneficial novelties of
the LLC form. A rough look at the data seems to raise more
questions than it answers on this point.
a. The RapidAcceptance of the LLC Form
Table 2 shows that firms have rapidly embraced the LLC form.
Because LLCs must adopt new forms and agreements that differ
from those already developed for partnerships and corporations, 179
firms' move to the LLC form arguably refutes the network
externalities theory. That seems particularly to be the case in light
of firms' failure to adopt special close corporation statutes despite
the latter's linkage with the existing network of corporate case law,
customs and expertise. Moreover, there is significant anecdotal
evidence that lawyers pushed hard for LLC statutes in their
states, 80 thereby supporting the hypothesis that lawyers' groups
can internalize the benefits of network creation.
b. The Evolution of LLC Statutes
The evolution of the LLC statutes themselves also tends to refute
the hypothesis that network externalities locked firms into existing
forms. Network externalities might be expected to lock in early
versions of the LLC form, particularly if those versions might be
179. See Lee, supra note 20, at 929 n.245.
180. Carney, supra note 21, at 857-59; Carol R. Goforth, The Rise ofthe Limited Liability
Company: Euidence of aRace Between the States, But HeadingWhere?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1193 (1995).

118

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:79

described as "focal." In fact, there has been considerable evolution
in LLC provisions."18 For example, the 1977 Wyoming statute,
which was essentially a modified limited partnership,182 did not become the model. Nor did the Delaware statute, despite Delaware's
"brand name" in corporate law. Dissociation and dissolution
provisions illustrate the absence of lock-in. LLCs initially followed
the limited partnership model of permitting members to cash out of
the firm at any time on appropriate notice, usually six months. Tax
classification rules undoubtedly encouraged use of this format
because restrictions on dissolution or dissociation were viewed 18as3
corporate features that might lead to corporate tax classification.
LLC statutes gradually evolved to permit contracting for continuity.18 4 This response to changing tax law illustrates adaptation
rather than lock-in. With the abandonment of tax classification,
states rapidly moved toward repealing LLC members' default right
to resell their interests back to the firm.' This accommodated the
use of LLCs for family firms by providing a statutory basis for
claiming estate tax discounts. 88 It also increased firms' stability
and reduced potential opportunism by exiting members,187 although
those objectives could be accomplished by agreement alone without
changing the statutory default rule.
c. The "Stickiness"of the CorporateForm
The average number of incorporations per state has remained
steady despite the rise of the LLC. 88 Thus, all other things equal,
181. See Ribstein,supranote 5. For similar evidence regarding the evolutionofAustralian
corporate charter provisions, see Michael J. Whincop, An Empirical Investigation of the
Terms of CorporateCharters and Influences on Term Standardizationin a Laissez-Faire
Environment, at http'//papers.ssrn.com/paper.ta?.abstract-id=231048 (Sept. 5,2000).
182. Carney, supra note 21, at 857-59.
183. For a discussion of the prior tax rule, see Ribstein, supra note 3, at 458.
184. Ribstein, supra note 5, at 425-28.
185. See supranote 107 and accompanyingtext; R1BSTEIN&KEATINGE, supranote 26, app.
11-1 (tabulating state provisions).
186. I.R.C. § 2704 (West 2000); RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, §§ 18.01-.13.
187. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
188. Based on 1988 through 1999 annual reports from the International Association of
Corporation Administrators (IACA). See 1988 through 1999 IACA ANN. REPS. OF THE
JURISDIcTIONS. The IACA data is described infra note 198.
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and assuming total business formations have remained fairly
constant, LLCs appear to be replacing partnerships but not
corporations. This might be explained by network externalities.
LLC statutes are much more similar to partnership than to
corporation statutes. This lets LLCs make greater use of the
existing network of partnership forms than of the existing network
of corporate forms. In addition, Subchapter S corporations appear
to involve fewer tax issues that have been left unresolved by the
existing network of law and legal opinions than exist under
Subchapter K, particularly as applied to the relatively new LLC
form."8 9 Both types of problems may be inducing firms to stick with
the existing corporate "network" rather than forming LLCs.
d. The Timing of the Move
The timing of LLCs replacement of the partnership form may be
reconciled with the network externalities story. LLCs arguably
replaced partnerships only when the non-network benefits of the
move increased to the point they outweighed the network effects.
For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which brought down
individual tax rates, made the corporate tax shelter less useful and
made the search for an unincorporated limited liability business
form more imperative. 90 Alternatively, the rise of the LLC might be
attributed to increased competition in the legal services market, or
to LLCs'increased salience in the media, creating expectations that
a significant number of firms would move to the new network.
e. Should There be More LLCs?
If the corporate form is advantageous for some firms, the fact
that firms are continuing to incorporate fails to indicate the
presence of network externalities. For example, the defects of LLC
default rules for some firms, including the excessive impermanence
of the form, 191 may explain why some firms prefer to incorporate.
189. Lee, supranote 20, at 929.
190. See generally Hamill, supra note 26.
191. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
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Further, the "inside" tax shelter of the corporate form192 suggests
firms that can retain earnings are still incorporating. Indeed, firms'
failure to rush to the LLC form despite these considerations
arguably indicates the absence of network externalities. If all firms
had moved to the LLC form, this might suggest that the rush to the
LLC was a bandwagon to sub-optimal uniformity, or "tipping" to a
new standard to avoid being stuck in an abandoned product. 9 '
4. LLPs
A main point of this Article is that comparing formations of LLCs
with those of LLPs provides important insights into theories about
choice of organization form, particularly regarding the role of
network externalities. In linking LLP provisions to general partnership statutes, legislatures employ a device that avoids network
externalities by giving the new form the advantage of an existing
partnership network of cases and forms.' 9 ' Thus, linkage may be a
cost-effective way to deal with network externalities if they exist.
Comparing the success of the LLP form with a similar non-linked
alternative-the LLC-indicates the significance of network effects.
As discussed in Part III, our evidence shows that most firms have
preferred the LLC.
The significance of firms' rejection of the LLP form depends
largely on whether the LLP has disadvantages that would cause
firms to reject it even if network externalities are considerable.
Table 1 summarizes differences between LLCs and LLPs. In
general, LLP default rules are not as well suited for limited liability
firms as those of the LLC, particularly regarding management and
dissociation. This suggests that some cases and forms based on the
partnership model also will be unsuited for these firms. 195 On the
192. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
193. This effect would be similar to one that Kahan and Klausner assert occurred with
regard to event risk bond provisions. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 124, at 740-60.
194. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
195. Although the LLP form seems to have been designed for professional firms only, in
most states, non-professional firms can use the LLP form. The exceptions are California,
Nevada, New York, and Oregon. BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, supra note 29, § 2.03(aX3). The
states may be price-discriminating in their limited liability offerings, reserving the ultimate
extension of limited liability only to the specific category of professional firms that lobbied
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other hand, as discussed above,198 LLPs have advantages over LLCs
in terms of tax and switching costs. In general, the net disadvantages of the LLP over the LLC would not seem to be enough
to deter firms from using the form if network externalities are
significant. The data presented below in Part III indicating the role
of various choice-of-form factors support this conclusion.
One might argue that firms' rejection of the LLP form does not
support the nonexistence of network externalities because LLPs
were invented in 1991, three years after the tax ruling that led to
the spread of LLC statutes, by which time any network effects
may have disappeared. To be sure, our data can be read as consistent with this conclusion. This, however, arguably would suggest
that network effects are too short-lived to have important policy
implications.
III. DATA ON THE CHOICE OF FORM: LLCs vs. LLPs
Part II shows that there are many diverse and conflicting
factors potentially underlying firms' choice of organizational form.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that it is difficult to isolate any
single explanation. In particular, it is impossible to predict with
certainty the effect of network externalities on the LLCJLLP ratio.
However, we can isolate the role of network externalities to a
certain extent by clarifying our assumptions and simplifying the
issues. This Part presents data comparing formation of LLCs in
each state with formation of LLPs over the same period. This
comparison is significant because, as discussed above, LLCs and
LLPs were developed over approximately the same period and are
comparable in many respects. This permits isolation of specific
factors that matter to firms' choice of organizational form. A key
difference between LLCs and LLPs is that the latter link with the
partnership "network" of cases and forms. Thus, if network
externalities were important, firms would tend to prefer the LLP
to the LLC form, other factors being equal. Also, state-by-state
for it.
196. See supranotes 114-35 and accompanying text.
197. See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
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comparisons of formations can reveal the roles of taxes and
governance rules in choice of form.
In general, the data show that firms preferred the LLC to the
LLP form by wide margins except in states where tax or other
disadvantages of the LLC form were significant. Table 2 presents
LLC and LLP formation data by state for the years 1993-1999.'
Table 3 shows the average LLC and LLP formations per year by
state and the corresponding LLCJLLPRatio.199 Figure 1 graphically
illustrates the relationship between the average LLC and LLP
formations. It is significant that the LLC/LLP Ratio is greater than
one in every state in every year, and that only seven of forty-nine
jurisdictions have a LLC/LLP Ratio of less than 10:1.
The state-by-state data also shows the effect of tax and other
considerations on firms' decisions to adopt the LLC form. If the
effects of network externalities were strong, we would not expect
such tax or other considerations to cause firms to choose LLCs over
LLPs. But Table 3 shows that, of the seven states with LLC/LLP
ratios of less than 10:1, two states-Pennsylvania and Texasimposed corporate income taxes on LLCs but not on LLPs during
the relevant period. 00 Indeed, Texas's invention of the LLP may
be at least partly attributable to this fact. Additionally, two of
the states with the lowest LLC/LLP Ratios-Minnesota and
North Dakota-have LLC statutes whose unusual corporate-type

198. The data set forth in Table 2 is from annual reports by IACA, which in turn obtains
its data from state secretaries of state. The IACA data combines domestic and foreign
unincorporated firms. Because we do not know how the reporting states collect their data,
we cannot verify the accuracy ofthese figures. Because filings are relatively objective events,
however, it is unlikely that the data are skewed toward one or the other entity, rather than
simply reporting too many or too few of both entities. Thus the data probably accurately
reflects relative numbers ofLLCs and LLPs, the subject of interest here.
199. The average figures reflect all years in which a state had both an LLP and an LLC
statute in effect for the entire year, and years where both the LLC and LLP statues were in
effect for a part of the year, but became effective in the same month. Table 2 presents a
complete listing.
200. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; see also RESEARCH INST. OF AMERICA,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, at 222-D (1999). Currently, only Texas taxes LLCs and LLPs
differently. CARTER G. BISHOPAND DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIAIuTY COMPANiES:

TAX AND BusINEss LAw (1994 & Supp. 2000) §§ 1.08-.08[6]. Florida imposes an intangibles
tax only on LLCs, Pennsylvania imposes a franchise tax only on LLCs, and Michigan levies
a corporate income tax on both LLPs and LLCs. Id.
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complexity may have deterred use of the LLC form." 1 This
explanation would emphasize benefits of the LLP default rules
rather than network externalities.
Table 4 reports the results of a regression analysis of the state
and year data listed in Table 2.202 This analysis examines specific
hypotheses concerning the role of various choice-of-form factors.
The analysis includes results for states that had both LLC and LLP
statutes in effect for the whole year and for those where both
statutes were in effect for equal parts of a year. Our initial regression model examines the LLC/LLP ratio and how the two factors
discussed above affect this ratio. Specifically, our model considers
the effect on the LLC/LLP ratio of a state adversely taxing LLCs
relative to LLPs (LLC DIFF. TAX), 203
and having a complex LLC
statute (COMPLEX LLC STATUTE).
The choice-of-form factors in Part II suggest that, if network
externalities were very significant, there would be more LLP than
LLC formations. This follows from the fact that the overall
advantages and disadvantages ofthe forms are approximately equal
with respect to the other choice-of-form factors we discuss. More
specifically, LLPs balance tax and switching cost advantages
against disadvantages related to linkage with the general partnership form. For purposes of clarifying our results, we state the
"null hypothesis" for network externalities as holding that LLP
formations would exceed LLC formations. This means that this
result would tend to suggest the existence of network externalities.
We do not contend that a particular ratio demonstrates or disproves
201. The complexity test is described infra note 203.
202. The Table applies a "logit" model, in which the dependent variable is the log of the
LLP/LLC ratio. Under this model, we estimate the probability that a firm in state i during
year j chooses to form an LLC by applying the formula P. = LLC/(LLC5 + LLPO). The
dependent variable equals log(P/(1- PQ)) = log(LLCV1LLPQ). Thus, the null hypothesis under
the network externalities theory, that LLC/LLP ratio is less than one, is equivalent to the
hypothesis that the log of the average LLC/LLP ratio is less than zero. ROBERTS. PINDYCK
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS 289-90 (2d ed.
1981) (discussing logit model).
203. The results were estimated using ordinary least squares. As a proxy for complexity,
we set the COMPLEX LLC STATUTE variable at 1 if the state's LLC statute length (in
bytes) was more than two standard deviations above the average state's LLC statute length.
Under this formulation, we found Illinois, North Dakota, Minnesota and Tennessee to have
complex statutes. The relatively high LLC/ILLP ratio for Illinois may result from the fact that
LLCs but not LLPs may practice law. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 26, § 15.14.
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the existence of network externalities, but only that the LLC/LLP
ratio provides relevant information bearing on the importance of
network externalities.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the CONSTANT term is positive and
statistically significant. This result supports rejection of the null
hypothesis under the network externalities theory." 4 Thus, the data
does not support the proposition that network externalities impede
development of new statutory business forms. The adoption of the
LLP form by only a small fraction of firms suggests that only the
firms for which the LLP is most suitable, such as the professional
firms for which the LLP initially was invented, 5 are forming LLPs.
Other regression results confirm the rejection of the network
externalities hypothesis. Table 4 shows that LLPs are most successful where this business form has the highest relative nonnetwork-externalitybenefits-that is, where it avoids state taxes or
avoids a complex LLC statute. States that adversely tax LLCs and
that have relatively complex LLC statutes have lower ratios of
LLCs to LLPs. 2 6 Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that tax
and other considerations do not affect the rate of LLC adoptions.
We have considered whether specific advantages of LLCs bias
choice of form in favor of LLCs and therefore might indicate that
firms have chosen the LLC form even though the LLP significantly
reduces network externalities. One important factor is the ability
to form single-member LLCs, which facilitates use of this form for
sole proprietorships and for branches of other firms. Virtually all
states allow single member LLCs, 07 while partnerships and LLPs
204. The CONSTANT term in the regression equals the log of average LLC/LLP ratio for
a base" firm that lacks any ofthe other characteristics in the regression (thatis, one without
differential taxation or a complex statute). The fact that the CONSTANT is positive and
statistically significant at standard significance levels allows us to reject the null hypothesis
for such a firm. See supra note 202.
205. See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
206. The average LLCLLP ratio in a state with equal tax treatment of LLPs and LLCs
and with a non-complex LLC statute is 36.23. In states that adversely tax LLCs, this ratio
falls to 6.42, and where LLC statutes are complex this ratio falls to 13.33. These coefficients
are statistically significant. See infra Table 4 p. 138.
207. As shown in Table 2, as of 1999 only Washington, D.C. and Massachusetts did not
allow single member LLCs. D.C. subsequently amended its statute to permit single-member
LLCs. Limited Liability Company Amendment Act of 2000, D.C.L. 13-133, 1999 D.C. Stat.
133 (West 2000).
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must have two or more members. Although formation data does not
separate single-member from multiple-member LLCs, we can
control for the effect of single member LLCs by comparing ratios
during times when LLC statutes did, and did not, provide for single
member LLCs. ONE MEMBER LLC variables denote whether
states allowed formation of one-member LLCs for all or part of a
given year. Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the effects are small
and not statistically significant. 2 ' These data reject the hypothesis
that single-member benefits of LLCs explain its dominance of the
LLP form.
The evolution of LLP statutes provides additional evidence
against the role of network externalities. Many LLP statutes
originally provided for only a partial liability shield for torts but not
contracts. 20 9 This gave firms the liability protection they needed

most while, perhaps, smoothing potential political opposition to
expanding limited liability to full-fledged partnerships.210 However,
Table 2 shows that by 1999, most statutes included "full-shield"
provisions providing protection for all kinds of liabilities.211 This
indicates that, as with LLCs, 2 the early form of the statute was
not locked-in. Column 2 of Table 4 shows that full year adoption of
a full-shield statute increases the ratio of LLPs to LLCs. s
Table 4 also reports the regressions that include a dummy
variable denoting whether the state's LLP statute was restricted to
use by professional firms (LLP RESTRICTED).21 ' States with this
restriction had lower LLC/LLP ratios. This may reflect the tailoring
of the LLP statute to professional firms. The effect is not large in
magnitude, however, and it is not statistically significant except
after eliminating outlier LLC/LLP ratios greater than 300.15
208. Based on the regression coefficients reported in Column 2 of Table 4, the average
1993-4 LLC/LLP Ratio in states that do not allow single member LLCs is 15.3, while the
average LLC/LLP ratio is 18.7 in those states that do.
209. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supranote 29, §§ 1.01(a)-(b).
210. See supra note 195.
211. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, §§ 1.01(c), 3.03, tbl. 3-1 (categorizing current
LLP statutes).
212. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
213. The coefficients show that this result is statistically significant. Table 2 shows that
part-year adoption negatively affects this ratio, but the result is not statistically significant.
214. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
215. More generally, Columns 3 and 4 ofTable 4 report results for observations where the
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Figure 2 shows that results are not generally affected by a
"sensitivity" analysis that shows the effect of dropping a single state
out of the regression. The CONSTANT terms for forty-eight such
regressions range from 2.41 to 2.88 (corresponding to an average
base LLC/LLP ratio ranging from 11.1 to 17.8) and are statistically
significant throughout all regressions. The tax variable ranges from
-1.41 to -2.04 and is also statistically significant in all forty-eight
regressions.2 1 6
Table 4 provides further evidence against the importance of
network externalities by showing that the LLC/LLP ratio increased
during a period of two changes that increased the inherent benefits
of LLCs. First, beginning on January 1, 1997, the IRS eliminated,
through the adoption of the "check-the-box" rule, the complex tax
classification rules for LLCs. 2 17 This rule eliminated unpredictability in tax classification of unincorporated firms. The rule
might be expected to increase the relative net benefits of using
either the LLC or LLP form over the corporate form without
affecting the LLC/LLP ratio. But viewed in conjunction with other
choice-of-form factors, an increase in the LLC/LLP ratio following
check-the-box would be consistent with firms' choosing the LLC
form over both the corporate and LLP forms, with the latter choice
attributable to inherent benefits of the LLC over the LLP despite
network externalities benefits from the LLP form.
Second, following the change in tax classification rules, many
states quickly amended their statutes to restrict member
dissociation. This had several potential advantages, particularly a
LLC/LLP ratio is less than 300. This deletes observations from Georgia for all years, and
from Delaware for 1996-1999. This has little effect on the results except for the one noted in
the text.
216. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient for the COMPLEX LLC STATUTE
variable are sensitive to the exclusion of some observations. As noted above, LLC formations
may have been deterred bythe unusual nature of the North Dakota and Minnesota statutes.
See discussion supra note 201 and accompanying text. Deleting the North Dakota or
Minnesota observations produces smaller and statistically insignificant results for the
COMPLEX LLC STATUTE variable. In contrast, LLP formations in Illinois and Tennessee
may have been suppressed by those states' rules deterring use of the LLP form by law firms.
See supra note 203. Deleting Illinois or Tennessee produces COMPLEX LLC STATUTE
coefficients of -1.37 and -1.43 respectively. For further discussion of these states, see infra
note 221.
217. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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stronger basis for firms to claim estate tax discounts. 2 18 Thus, the
increased LLC/LLP ratio following check-the-box might indicate
increased inherent net benefits resulting from eliminating a defect
(relatively unrestricted dissociation) in the LLC statutes.2 1 9 In other
words, the change in dissociation provisions helps isolate a benefit
of the LLC form that might lead firms to choose this form over the
LLP form once freed of tax incentives to incorporate.
Table 5 helps to isolate the effects of these two changes. The
RESTRICTED DISSOCIATION variables indicate whether the3
state statute restricted dissociation for a full year (FY) or part of a
year (PY). 22" The analogous CHECK THE BOX variables reflect the
effect on LLC/LLP ratios of years in which the simplified federal tax
classification rules were in effect. The dissociation variable had
positive and statistically significant effects on the ratio of LLCs to
LLPs in both regressions. The CHECK THE BOX result is positive
in both regressions but statistically significant only in the LLC/LLP
< 300 regression. This difference in the robustness of statistical
significance to outliers indicates that it was changes in dissociation
provisions after check-the-box that tended to attract firms to the
LLC form. In any event, formation ratios during this period further
indicate that inherent benefits, not network externalities, are
driving choice of form." 1
218. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
219. The increased ability under check-the-box to combine corporate features and
partnership taxation might induce fewer firms to incorporate, but this alone would not affect
the LLC/LLP ratio.
220. The following states changed their statutes to restrict dissociation after the adoption
of the check-the-box rules: AK, CT, IA, MD, MI, MO, NV, NH, OH, RI (1997); AL, KY, MS
(1998); AR, FL, IN, ME, NY, NC (1999); KS (2000). In addition, nine states (CA, DE, GA, NE,
NJ, OK, OR, VA, WA) restricted dissociation prior to 1997. See RIBSMEIN & KEATINGE, supra

note 26, app. 11-1.
221. The regressions reported in Table 5 also control for the two states-Illinois and
Tennessee-restricting use of the LLP form by law firms. See supranote 203. As expected,
the coefficient on the LLP NO LAW variable is positive and statistically significant in both
regressions. Results for the other variables are substantively and quantitatively unchanged
from those reported in Table 4. In addition, during the editorial process we obtained LLC and
LLP formation data from IACA for the year 2000. The LLC/LLP ratios for thirty-four states
reporting data in 2000 averaged 129.34 with a median of 61.49. The minimum ratio is 2.42
(North Dakota, a state with a complexLLC statute). Only one other state (Minnesota at 3.35,
also with a complex statute) has a LLC/LLP ratio under 10. We also re-ran the regression
analyses reported in Tables 4 and 5 with an expanded dataset that included the year 2000
data. Inclusion ofthis data did not change the results reported in the Article or the statistical
significance of the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 and caused only minor changes in
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

We have examined the role of various factors in firms' choice of
organizational form. In particular, we present data on the formation
rates of LLPs and LLCs. These data are revealing because the two
business forms are close substitutes in many respects, which
permits us to isolate particular factors that determine choice of
form. One key difference is that LLPs' link to the existing"network7
of partnership law suggests that firms would prefer the LLP to
the LLC form if network externalities matter. Evidence of this
preference would support the theory that network externalities are
an inherent impediment to choice of organizational form and the
normative conclusion that the law should address this defect.
In fact, examination of formations shows that most firms prefer
LLCs to the linked LLP form. Moreover, the relative popularity of
the LLP form in states imposing entity taxes on LLCs but not LLPs
indicates that tax considerations may matter more than network
externalities to the choice of business form. Conversely, larger inherent benefits of LLCs in particular states and years appear to
cause firms to prefer the LLC form despite the potential network
externalities benefits of the LLP form. Thus, our data suggest that
network externalities are not a significant impediment to firms'
choosing the organizational form appropriate for their business.
Our data has important policy implications. The network externalities theory is a potentially significant argument for market
failure relating to choice of business forms. However, there is little
hard data on the existence of network externalities in this context.
Although our evidence does not definitively negate the role of
network externalities in choice of business form, and does not
directly relate to network externalities in other contexts, such as
the dominant role of Delaware law, it raises enough doubt to
suggest the need for more data before basing legal policy on
network externalities.

the magnitude of these coefficients. A dummy variable equal to 1 for year 2000 data was both
positive and statistically significant at the .001 level or greater for all specifications.
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Table 1 - The Attributes of Business Associations
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Table 2 - Formation Data by State
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1998

1999

1879

2389

72.27

77.06

NOTES
= STATUTE NOT EFFECTIVE
- =

.
***

DATA NOT REPORTED TO IACA

MEMBER LLCs ALLOWED (* DENOTES PART YEAR)
PONE
" LLP STATUE HAS FULL SHIELD ( DENOTES PART YEAR)
= STATUTE EFFECTIVE PART OF THE YEAR
LLP AND LLC EFFECTIVE AS OF SAME MONTH AND YEAR

= NUMBER OF MEMBERS REQUIRED TO FORM LLC NOT SPECIFIED
a = DATA DIRECTLY FROM STATE
b = DATA REPORTED BASED ON FISCAL YEAR

2001]

CHOICE OF FORM AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

135

Table 3 - Summary State Formation Data
LLCIYEAR
431.50
3031.80
656.75

LLPIYEAR
234.50
1192.60
119.00

N
4
5
4

AK

534.00

89.00

1

6.00

0.86

WI

5470.50
9551.25
3444.55
3938.25
3777.00

819.50
766.50
269.82
285.75
300.33

4
4
5.5
4
3

6.68
12.46
12.77
13.78
12.58

0.87
0.93
0.93
0.93
0.93

4027.00
1245.00
4505.50
2133.75
11535.85
6121.71
10606.50
5788.67
2179.40
6002.67
1369.00
3029.64
2315.60
1615.20
1367.33
660.00
22420.00
13634.50
1669.50
2560.50
4650.71
904.75
7628.00
11803.50

272.50
73.50
259.50
122.75
638.46
333.43
560.50
267.33
84.20
209.67
42.33
92.18
69.00
48.00
40.33
19.00
525.50
300.50
35.50
54.00
97.29
17.50
140.50
213.50
82.60

2
2
4
4
6.5
3.5
4
6
5
3
3
5.5
5
2.5
3
1
4
4
2
2
7
4
4
2
5

14.78
16.94
17.36
17.38
18.07
18.36
18.92
21.65
25.88
28.63
32.34
32.87
33.56
33.65
33.90
34.74
42.66
45.37
47.03
47.42
47.80
51.70
54.29
55.29
66.44

0.94
0.94
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.96
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.9

STATE
ND
MN
SD

SC
MA
MD
AL
DC
IN
ID
NY
OH
CO
NC
IA
Mo
NE
KY
KS
HI
RI
WV
CA
OR
MS
AR
LA
ME
WA
NJ
IL

-5488.20

LLCILLP LLC(LLC+LLPA
1.84
0.651
2.54
0.721
5.52
0.85
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2075.5
2302.33
2134.00
13885.00
7984.60
4573.33
15611.40
63825,.
504360.00
6878.75
17901.33
5505.00

NM
NH
WY
CT
VA
OK
M1
TN
UT
NV
DE
GA
VT

30.5
32.00
28.50
173.50
91.80
47.33
133.80

2
3
2
4
5
3
5

28.00
33.00
31.00
10.00

1
4
6
4

**
LLPIYEAR
LLCIYEAR
5535.35
233.05
MfEAN
4360.00
119.00
MIED.
STD. DEV.]
4846.30
285.13

~

LLC Diff. Tax
Commpex Statute

68.05
71.95
74.88
80.03
86.98
96.62
116.68
137.26155.71
208.45
577.46
550.50
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0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00

0**
LLCOILP LLC(LLC+LLP)
64.94
0.95
0.97
33.56
112.21
0.07

2001]
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Figure 1 - LLC & LLP Adoptions
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Table 4 - Regression Results
ALL OBSERVATIONS

CONSTANT

3.59**
(37.00)
-1.73**
(-4.87)
-1.00**
(-3.27)

LLC DIFF. TAX
COMPLEX LLC STATUTE
ONE MEMBER LLC (FULL YEAR)
ONE MEMBER LLC (PART YEAR)

2.73**
(6.89)
-1.70**
(-4.75)
-0.85**
(2.69)

LLC/LLP < 300

3.42**
(38.66)
-1.56**
(-4.95)
-0.83**
(-3.05)

I

2.82**
(8.66)
-1.39**
(-4.74)
-0.73**
(-2.80)

0.19

-0.19

(0.77)

(-0.87)

-0.02

-0.31

LLP RESTRICTED

(-0.05)
0.41
(1.33)

(-1.12)
0.74**
(2.90)

LLP FULL SHIELD (FULL YEAR)

-0.63**

-0.90**

(-3.24)

(-5.47)

LLP FULL SHIELD (PART YEAR)
YEAR = 1995
YEAR = 1996
YEAR = 1997
YEAR= 1998

YEAR = 1999
N
SSR
SE REGRESSION
R SQUARED
DJ. R S.
LOG LIKELIHOOD

0.13

-0.06

(0.31)

(-0.16)

0.71

0.35

(1.51)

(0.87)

0.79*

.64*

(1.81)

(1.77)

0.81*

.91 **

(1.82)

(2.48)

1.21 **

1.40**

(2.67)
1.25**
(2.69)
193
193
290.22 257.58
1.24
1.20
0.14
0.24
0.13
0.19
-313.22 -301.71

(3.74)
1.56**
(4.05)
183
163.14
0.98
0.35
0.30
-249.16

t-statistics in parentheses
** Statistically significant at .05 level for a two-tailed test.
* Statistically significant at .10 level for a two-tailed test.
Figure 2 - Sensitivity Analysis

183
213.95
1.09
0.15
0.14
-273.96
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Table 5 - Additional Regression Results
ALL OBSERVATIONS

CONSTANT
LC DIFF. TAX
COMPLEX LLC STATUTE
ONE MEMBER LLC (FULL YEAR)
ONE MEMBER LLC (PART YEAR)
RESTRICTED DISSOCIATION (FY)
RESTRICTED DISSOCIATION (PY)
LLP RESTRICTED
LLP FULL SHIELD (FULL YEAR)
LLP FULL SHIELD (PART YEAR)
LLP NO LAW
CHECK THE BOX

N
SSR
SE REGRESSION
R SQUARED
ADJ. R SQ.
LOG LIKELIHOOD

3.12**
(18.08)
-1.65**
(-5.37)
-2.34**
(-6.05)
0.20
(0.96)
-0.02
(-0.08)
0.88**
(4.63)
0.57**
(2.18)
0.11
(0.41)
-0.20
(-1.12)
0.04
(0.10)
3.55**
(6.85)
0.12
(0.63)
193
191.15
1.03
0.44
0.40
-272.92

t-statistics in parentheses
** Statistically significant at .05 level for a two-tailed test.
* Statistically significant at .10 level for a two-tailed test.

LLCILLP < 3001

3.01 **
(20.86)
-1.43**
(-5.67)
-2.19**
(-6.91)
-0.01
(-0.07)
-0.22
(-0.91)
0.56**
(3.46)
0.31
(1.36)
0.44"**
(1.99)
-0.40**
(-2.69)
-0.03
(-0.09)
3.32**
(7.79)
0.51**
(3.08)
183
121.52
0.84
0.52
0.49
-222.21

